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Abstract
A dynamic model of the social relations between workers and capitalists is intro-
duced. The model is deduced from the assumption that the law of value is an
organising principle of modern economies. The model self-organises into a dynamic
equilibrium with statistical properties that are in close qualitative and in many cases
quantitative agreement with a broad range of known empirical distributions of de-
veloped capitalism, including the power-law distribution of firm size, the Laplace
distribution of firm and GDP growth, the lognormal distribution of firm demises,
the exponential distribution of the duration of recessions, the lognormal-Pareto dis-
tribution of income, and the gamma-like distribution of the rate-of-profit of firms.
Normally these distributions are studied in isolation, but this model unifies and
connects them within a single causal framework. In addition, the model generates
business cycle phenomena, including fluctuating wage and profit shares in national
income about values consistent with empirical studies. A testable consequence of
the model is a conjecture that the rate-of-profit distribution is consistent with a
parameter-mix of a ratio of normal variates with means and variances that depend
on a firm size parameter that is distributed according to a power-law.
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1 Introduction
The dominant social relation of production within capitalism is that between
capitalists and workers. A small class of capitalists employ a large class of
workers organized within firms of various sizes that produce goods and services
for sale in the marketplace. Capitalist owners of firms receive revenue and
workers receive a proportion of the revenue as wages.
Over the last hundred years or more the number and type of material objects
and services processed by capitalist economies have significantly changed, but
the social relations of production have not. Marx [27] proposed the distinction
between the forces of production and the social relations of production to
convey this idea. The existence of a social relationship between a class of
capitalists and a class of workers mediated by wages and profits is an invariant
feature of capitalism, whereas the types of objects and activities subsumed
under this social relationship is not.
The social relations of production constitute an abstract, but nevertheless real,
enduring social architecture that constrains and enables the space of possible
economic interactions. These social constraints are distinct from any natural
or technical constraints, such as those due to scarcities or current production
techniques. Therefore, unlike many economic models that theorise relations
of utility between economic actors and scarce commodity types (i.e., actor
to object relations studied under the rubric of neo-classical economics), or
theorise relations of technical dependence between material inputs and out-
puts (i.e., object to object relations studied under the rubric of neo-Ricardian
economics) the model developed here entirely abstracts from these relations
and instead theorises relations of social dependence mediated by value (i.e.,
actor to actor relations, arguably a defining feature of Marxist economics).
The model ontology is therefore quite sparse, consisting solely of actors and
money. The aim is to concentrate as far as possible on the economic conse-
quences of the social relations of production alone, that is on the enduring
social architecture, rather than particular and perhaps transitory economic
mechanisms, such as particular markets, commodity types and industries. As
the worker-capitalist relation is dominant in developed capitalism the model
abstracts from land, rent, states and banking. Plus, there are important causal
relationships between the forces and relations of production, but in this paper
they are ignored.
In what follows a dynamic, computational model of the social architecture
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of capitalism is defined and a preliminary analysis given. It replicates some
important empirical features of modern capitalism.
2 A dynamic model of the social relations of production
The elements of the model are a set of N economic actors (labelled 1, . . . , N).
Each actor i at time t holds a non-negative endowment of paper money,mi(t) ∈
R
+, measured in ‘coins’. Mechanisms that alter the money supply are ignored
and therefore the total money in the economy is a finite constantM , such that∑N
i=1mi(t) = M . Each actor i has an integer employer index, 0 ≤ ei(t) ≤ N
and ei(t) 6= i, which specifies the actor’s employer. If ei(t) = 0 the actor is
not employed, otherwise if ei(t) = j then actor j is the employer of actor i.
The state of each actor is therefore fully specified by the pair (mi, ei), and
the static state of the whole economy at time t is simply the set of pairs
S(t) = {(mi, ei) : 1 ≤ i ≤ N}.
The actors in the economy are naturally partitioned into three sets or classes:
an employing or capitalist class C, an employee or working class W , and an
unemployed class U . An actor is a capitalist, i ∈ C, if its employee set is
non-empty, Wi(t) = {x : ex = i, 1 ≤ x ≤ N} 6= ∅. An actor is a worker,
i ∈ W , if its employee index is non-zero, ei 6= 0. An actor is unemployed,
i ∈ U , if its employee index is zero, ei = 0. In this model an actor cannot
belong to more than one class; therefore the sets of capitalists, workers and
unemployed are disjoint, C ∩ W ∩ U = ∅, and their union forms the set of
all actors, A = C ∪ W ∪ U . More formally, C = {x : Wx 6= ∅ ∧ ex = 0},
W = {x : Wx = ∅ ∧ ex 6= 0} and U = {x : Wx = ∅ ∧ ex = 0}. The structure
of a firm is simply an employer and set of employees, and firm ownership is
limited to a single capitalist employer: there are no stocks or joint ownership.
Although the total number of actors is fixed this can be interpreted as a
stable workforce in which individuals enter and exit the workforce at the same
rate. An actor, therefore, represents an abstract role in the economy, rather
than a specific individual. The state evolution of the economy, St → St+1, is
determined by a set of predominately stochastic transition rules, which are
applied at each time step. Processes that involve subjective indeterminacy
(e.g., deciding to act in a given period) or elements of chance (e.g., finding
a buyer in the marketplace) are modelled by selection from a bounded set
according to a given probability distribution. Often the chosen distribution is
uniform in accordance with Bernoulli’s Principle of Insufficient Reason, which
states that in the absence of knowledge to the contrary assume all outcomes
are equally likely. More generally, each employment of a uniform distribution
can be considered as a default functional parameter of the model, which may
be replaced with a different distribution that has empirical support.
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2.1 The active actor
Each actor in the economy performs actions on average at the same rate, which
is modelled by allowing each actor an equal chance to perform its actions in
a given time period. Note however that an actor may act multiple times in
a given period, or not at all. The following rule selects an active actor who
subsequently has the opportunity to perform economic actions. The unit of
time is interpreted as a single month of real time, and therefore each actor is
active on average once each month.
Actor selection rule S1: (Stochastic).
(1) Randomly select an actor a from the set A according to a uniform
distribution.
2.2 Employee hiring
The labour market is modelled in a simple manner. All unemployed actors
seek employment, and all employers hire if they have sufficient ex ante funds
to pay the average wage. The wage interval, ω = [wa, wb], is a fixed, exogenous
parameter to the model. Wages are randomly chosen from the wage interval
according to a uniform distribution; hence the average wage is 〈w〉 = (wa +
wb)/2. The following hiring rule is applied if the active actor selected from
rule S1 is unemployed.
Hiring rule H1(a): (Stochastic).
(1) If actor a is unemployed, a ∈ U , then:
(a) Form the set of potential employers, H = {x : ex = 0, 1 ≤ x ≤
N} = C ∪ U .
(b) Select an employer, c ∈ H , according to the probability function:
P (c) =
mc∑
x∈H mx
(1)
that weighs potential employers by their wealth.
(c) If c’s money endowment mc exceeds the average wage, mc > 〈w〉,
then c hires a (set ea = c).
Hiring rule H1 allows all non-workers to potentially hire employees, including
hiring by other unemployed individuals to form new firms, but the chances
of hiring favour those employers with greater wealth, a stochastic bias that
represents the tendency of firm growth to depend on accumulation of capital
out of current profits [21]. But the stochastic nature of the rule reflects the
innumerable concrete reasons why particular firms are willing and able to hire
more workers than others.
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2.3 Expenditure on goods and services
Each actor spends its income on goods and services produced by firms. But
the particular purchases of an individual agent are not modelled. Instead,
they are aggregated into a single amount that represents the actor’s total
expenditure for the month. The total expenditure can represent multiple small
purchases, a single large purchase, or a fraction of a purchase amortized over
several months: the interpretation is deliberately flexible. Absent a theory
of consumption patterns the only relevant information is that expenditure is
bound by the amount of money an actor has. For simplicity assume that the
amount spent is bound by the actor’s coin endowment on a randomly selected
day. A consumer actor is selected to spend its income but the spent income is
not immediately transferred to firms. Instead, it is added to a pool of market
value that represents the currently available sum of consumer expenditures,
which firms compete for.
Expenditure rule E1(a): (Stochastic).
(1) Randomly select a consumer actor b from the set A− {a} according to
a uniform distribution.
(2) Randomly select an expenditure amount, m, from the interval [0, mb]
according to a uniform distribution.
(3) Add them coins to the available market value, V . (Hence, mb is reduced
by m and V is increased by m.)
This rule controls the expenditure of all consumers, whether workers, capital-
ists or unemployed. Different classes spend for different reasons, in particular
workers normally spend their incomes on consumption goods, whereas capital-
ists not only consume but invest. The payment of wages is treated separately,
and therefore capitalist expenditure according to rule E1 is interpreted as ex-
penditure on non-wage goods, such as capital goods or personal consumption.
The expenditure rule is also implicitly a saving rule as in a given period the
probability of an actor spending all its wealth is low.
2.4 Interaction between firms and the market
To simplify matters it is assumed that all means of production are controlled
by capitalist owners and therefore individual actors are unable to produce.
Self-employment is ignored in this model: productive work resulting in saleable
goods or services is performed only by actors within firms.
Each firm produces some collection of use-values that it attempts to sell in
the marketplace. But individual commodity types and sales are not modelled.
Instead, the total volume of a firm’s sales in a given period are disaggregated
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into market samples, which are transfers of money from marketplace to seller,
representing multiple separate transactions, or fractions of a single large trans-
action. At this level of abstraction the mapping from market samples to actual
material exchanges is ignored and assumed to be arbitrary.
Under normal circumstances a firm expects that a worker’s labour adds a
value to the product that is bound from below by the wage. A firm’s markup
on costs reflects this value expectation, which may or may not be validated
in the market. Obviously, there are multiple and particular reasons why a
worker adds more or less value to the firm’s total product, most of which
are difficult to measure, as partially reflected in the large variety of contested
and negotiable compensation schemes. The relation between concrete labour
and value-added is modelled by assuming that a firm randomly samples the
market once for every employee, to reflect the fact that each worker poten-
tially adds value, but random to reflect contingency and subsume the range
of possibilities, from slackers to Stackhonovites, or from replaceable admin-
istrators to irreplaceable film stars. This is a weak formulation of the law of
value [38,27,46], which implies that, absent profit-equalizing mechanisms and
rents, there is a statistical tendency for the value of a firm’s product to be
linearly related to the amount of social labour-time expended on the product.
In this formulation of the model there is no constant capital, and therefore
issues arising from the divergence of prices from labour values are ignored (see
refs. [39,40] for a discussion).
Each firm therefore samples the market to gain revenue for every worker em-
ployed. In an idealised freely competitive economy there is a tendency for
particular production advantages to be regularly adopted by competing firms,
including the removal of scarcities due to employment of particular kinds of
skilled labour. Therefore, the determinants of the value-added per worker may
be considered statistically uniform across firms. The statistical variation is in-
terpreted as representing transient differences in the value creating property of
different concrete labours. The value-added by an active worker to the firm’s
product is represented by a transfer of money from the current available mar-
ket value V . The actual value received in money-form depends on the prevail-
ing market conditions, and mismatches between value and exchange-value, or
more plainly, costs and revenue, determine whether firms are rewarded with
profits for performing socially-necessary labour.
The revenue received from the market is the legal property of the capitalist
owner. Capitalist owners therefore accrue revenue via market samples that
represent the social utility of the efforts of their workers. All these abstractions
are expressed in the following market sample rule:
Market sample rule M1(a): (Stochastic).
(1) If a is not unemployed, a ∋ U , then:
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(a) Randomly select a revenue amount m from the interval [0, V ] ac-
cording to a uniform distribution (V is reduced by m.)
(b) If actor a is an employee, a ∈ W , then transfer m coins to the em-
ployer, actor ea ∈ C (hence mea is increased by m.) Alternatively,
if actor a is a capitalist owner, a ∈ C, then transfer m coins to ac-
tor a (hence ma is increased by m). In either case the transferred
coins are counted as firm revenue.
The money received may represent value embodied in many different kinds of
products and services that are sold in arbitrary amounts to arbitrary numbers
of buyers. The market sample rule abstracts from the details of individual
market transactions and may be interpreted as modelling the aggregate effect
of a dynamic random graph that links sellers to buyers in each market period.
The stochastic nature of the rule subsumes innumerable reasons why particular
firms enjoy particular revenues: the only constraints are that revenue received
is determined by the available value in the marketplace, and that a firm with
more employees will on average sample the market on more occasions than a
firm with fewer employees, a bias justified by the law of value.
2.5 Employee firing
If the revenue received by a firm is insufficient to pay the wage bill then
the employer must reduce costs and fire employees. This is captured by the
following firing rule:
Firing rule F1(a): (Deterministic).
(1) If actor a is an employer, a ∈ C, then determine the number of workers
to fire, u, according to the formula:
u = max(|Wa| − [ma〈w〉 ], 0) (2)
In other words, no workers are fired if the ex ante wage bill is payable
from the firm’s current money holdings (the wage bill is calculated from
the average wage and the number of employees). Otherwise, the firm’s
workforce is reduced to a size such that the wage bill is payable.
(2) Select u actors from the set of employees, Wa = {x : ex = a, 1 ≤ x ≤
N}, according to a uniform distribution. For each selected actor, c, set
ec = 0 (i.e., fire them).
In this model there are no skill differences therefore each actor is identical. It
does not matter which particular workers are fired, simply the amount, and
so the particular individuals to fire are chosen randomly. Note the asymmetry
between hiring and firing: hiring occurs one individual at a time at a frequency
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determined by the number of unemployed actors, whereas firing may occur in
bulk at a frequency determined by the number of firms. Just as new firms may
form when two actors enter an employee-employer relationship, existing firms
may cease trading when all employees are fired and the capitalist owner enters
the unemployed class.
2.6 Wage payment
Employers pay wages according to the following rule, which implements the
transfer of value from capitalist to worker.
Wage payment rule W1(a): (Stochastic).
(1) For each actor c in a’s employee set, Wa = {x : ex = a, 1 ≤ x ≤ N}:
(a) transfer w coins from a to c, where w is selected from the discrete
interval [wa, wb] according to a uniform distribution. (If employee a
has insufficient funds to pay w then w is selected from the discrete
interval [0, ma] according to a uniform distribution.)
In reality wages are not subject to monthly stochastic fluctuations. A more
concrete model would introduce wage contracts between employer and em-
ployee that fix the individual employee’s wage for the duration of employment.
But in the aggregate, for example in terms of the total wage bill on average
payable by a firm, or wage and profit shares in national income, the existence
of monthly fluctuations in individual wages is not significant, and allows a
considerable simplification of the model.
2.7 Historical time
Finally, the above rules are combined and repeatedly executed to simulate the
functioning of the economy over time. The following simulation rule orders
the possible economic actions:
Simulation rule SR1: AllocateM/N coins to each of theN actors. Set ei = 0
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N (i.e., all actors are initially unemployed).
(1) Execute actor selection rule S1 to select the active actor a.
(2) Execute hiring rule H1(a).
(3) Execute expenditure rule E1(a) that augments the available market
value with new expenditure.
(4) If a is associated with a firm, execute market sample rule M1(a) that
transfers m coins from the market to the firm owner.
(5) Execute firing rule F1(a).
(6) Execute wage payment rule W1(a).
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The application of rule SR1 can generate a variety of events. For example, if
the active actor is unemployed it may get hired by an existing firm, or with
lower probability form a new small firm with another unemployed actor. An
employed active actor will generate a market sample for its employee, which
generates revenue bound by the available market value, itself a function of the
stochastic spending patterns of other actors. If the active actor is a capitalist
owner of a firm it may decide to fire employees if current revenues do not
cover the expected wage bill. If all employees are fired then the firm ceases
trading. Otherwise, the wage bill is paid, augmenting the spending power of
the working class, which on the next cycle will affect the available market
value that firms compete for, and so on.
A period of one month is defined as the N applications of rule SR1. This
means that on average wages are paid once per month.
One month rule 1M:
(1) Execute rule SR1.
(2) Repeat N times.
The rule is executed N times to allow each of the N actors an opportunity
to act. But clearly this does not guarantee that each actor will in fact act
within the month: some actors may act more than once, others not at all.
This introduces a degree of causal slack that is intended to model the fact that
in real economies events do not occur with strict regularity. In addition, the
repeated random selection of active actors during a simulated month breaks
any symmetries that might be introduced if actors are selected in a regular
order. In reality, economic actions occur both in order and in parallel and this
causal chaos is modelled by noisy selection.
A period of one year, which is the accounting period, is defined as 12 applica-
tions of the one month rule.
One year rule 1Y:
(1) Execute rule 1M.
(2) Repeat 12 times.
The time scale in the model is therefore calibrated to real time via the empir-
ical fact that on average wages are paid once each month.
The set of nine rules, {SR1,S1,H1,E1,M1,F1,W1, 1M, 1Y}, and three pa-
rameters – the total coins in the economy M , the total number of actors, N ,
and the fixed wage interval ω – constitute the dynamic, computational model
of the social relations of production, or Social Relations (SR) model for short.
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3 Results
The rules of the computational model are quite simple yet the dynamic be-
haviour of the simulation is rich and complex. A full analysis of the SR model is
beyond the scope of this paper. Instead the aim is provide a broad overview of
the empirical range of the model, demonstrate that it deserves further analysis,
and encourage others to replicate the computational experiment and begin a
full analytical treatment of its dynamics. Results are presented that show that
the model generates many of the important aggregate distributions of modern
capitalist economies, and therefore implicitly provides candidate explanations
of the causal relationships between them.
The total number of coins,M , and the total number of actors, N , on condition
that M >> N , appear to act as scaling parameters and do not affect the
dynamics, unlike the wage interval parameter. In all reported results, N =
1000 and M = 100000, so that the average wealth in the economy is 100
coins. On a posteriori grounds the wage interval is set to ω = [10, 90]; hence,
the minimum wage is 10 coins, the average wage 50 coins, half the mean wealth
in the economy, and the highest possible wage never exceeds the mean wealth.
This results in an almost equal split of national wealth between the two classes,
and generates data in good agreement with empirical data. A full exploration
of the consequences of varying the wage parameter on the aggregate dynamics
is postponed to a sequel.
The results are not sensitive to initial conditions and therefore the behaviour
of a single execution is analysed. The simulation very rapidly self-organises
into a stochastic equilibrium characterised by stationary distributions. Due to
the rapidity of convergence it makes little difference whether measurements
are taken over the duration of the simulation or after the stationary state has
been reached. Unless stated otherwise the model was allowed to run for 100
simulated years. The simulation does not settle to a motionless equilibrium
but converges to a dynamic equilibrium of ceaseless motion and change.
3.1 Class distribution
The social stratification generated by capitalist economies is a complex phe-
nomenon with systematic causal relations to the dominant social relations
of production. In reality the social relations of production are more complex
than the relations in the SR model (actors may receive combinations of wage
and property income and therefore belong to more than one economic class,
some actors are self-employed, others receive the majority of their income from
rent, many people work for governments rather than private enterprises, and
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Fig. 1. Class distributions: histograms of the number of actors in each economic class
with a constant bin size of 1. The smooth lines are fitted normal distributions. On
average approximately 71.2% of the population are workers, 12.3% are capitalists
employing one worker or more, and the remaining 16.6% are unemployed.
so forth). In consequence, some work is required to map empirical data on
social stratification to the more basic categories employed here. It is equally
clear, however, that the class of capitalists is numerically small, whereas the
class of workers, that is those actors who predominately rely on wage income
for their subsistence, constitute the vast majority of the population. The SR
model should reflect this empirical fact. The class breakdown in the SR model
can be measured according to the following rule:
Class size measure: After each year (an application of rule 1Y) count the
number of workers, |W |, capitalists, |C|, and unemployed, |U |.
Figure 1 is a histogram of class sizes generated by the model collected over the
duration of the simulation. The number of workers, capitalists and unemployed
are normally distributed. The normal distributions summarise a dynamic pro-
cess that supports social mobility, where actors move between classes during
their imputed lifetimes, occurring within a stable partition of the population
into two main classes – a small employing class and a larger employed class.
Fluctuations in class sizes are evidently mean-reverting, reflecting stable and
persistent class sizes, given the exogenous and constant wage interval. The
unemployment rate is higher than is usually reported in modern economies,
but real measures of unemployment typically discount frictional unemploy-
ment, whereas here all non-employed actors are considered unemployed, and,
in addition, there is no concept of self-employment. In conclusion, the SR
model self-organises into a realistic partition of the working population into a
minority of employers and a majority of employees.
3.2 Firm size distribution
Axtell [5] analysed US Census Bureau data for US firms trading between 1988
and 1997 and found that the firm size distribution followed a special case of
a power-law known as Zipf’s law, and this relationship persisted from year to
year despite the continual birth and demise of firms and other major economic
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Fig. 2. Firm size distribution: histogram of firm sizes by employees in log-log scale
with a constant bin size of 1. The straight line is an ordinary least squares regression
of the data and represents a power-law distribution P (x) ∝ x−(α+1) with exponent
α = 1.038 for data collected over 15 simulated years. Axtell [5] reports α = 1.059
from data of approximately 5.5 million U.S. firms in 1997. The special case α = 1
is known as the Zipf distribution.
changes. During this period the number of reported firms increased from 4.9
million to 5.5 million. Gaffeo et. al. [19] found that the size distribution of
firms in the G7 group over the period 1987-2000 also followed a power-law,
but only in limited cases was the power-law actually Zipf. Fuijiwara et. al. [18]
found that the Zipf law characterised the size distribution of about 260,000
large firms from 45 European countries during the years 1992–2001. A Zipf
law implies that a majority of small firms coexist with a decreasing number
of disproportionately large firms.
Firm sizes in the SR model are measured according to the following rule:
Firm sizes measure: After each month (an application of rule 1M) count
the number of employees in each firm.
The SR model replicates the empirical firm size distribution. Figure 2 is a
histogram of firm sizes. The straight line is a fit to the power-law:
P (x) ∝ x−(α+1) (3)
For data collected over a short time period, such as 15 simulated years, α
approaches 1.0. The special case α = 1.0 is Zipf, and hence the firm size
distribution generated by the model is consistent with the empirical data.
Data collected over shorter periods follows a power-law with exponent that
deviates from 1.
The largest US firm in 1997 had approximately 106 employees from a total
reported workforce of about 107 individuals [5]. Therefore, the largest firm size
should not exceed about 1
10
th of the total workforce. Figure 2 shows that, with
low but non-zero probability, a single firm can employ over half the workforce,
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representing a monopolisation of a significant proportion of the economy by
a single firm, a clearly unrealistic occurrence. A possible reason for the over-
monopolisation of the economy is the assumption that firms have a single
capitalist owner, which conflates capital concentration with firm ownership.
In reality, large firms normally have multiple owners and individual capitalists
own multiple firms. Further, there are many technical reasons why particular
firms do not grow beyond a certain size that are ignored in this model. A
final point is that the probability of monopoly within the period of observa-
tion decreases with the number of actors; hence, if the simulation were run
with N = 107 actors (which is not possible due to insufficient computational
resources) then it is unlikely that a single firm would employ half the work-
force. Gaffeo et. al. [19] note that firms are distributed more equally during
recessions than during expansions, which accounts for the yearly deviations
from Zipf. This relationship has not been tested in the SR model.
3.3 Firm growth distributions
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Fig. 3. Firm size growth rate distribution: histogram of the log growth rates of
firms per simulated year in linear-log scale with a constant bin size of 1. The LHS
graph shows growth rates of firm sales. The RHS graph shows growth rates of
employees. The solid lines are OLS regressions of the data and represent a Laplace
(double-exponential) distribution P (x) ∝ e−|(x−α)/β|. Refs. [24,7,43,1,3,2,15] report
that log growth rates of sales and employees of US and Italian firms follow a Laplace
distribution.
Stanley et. al. [43] and Amaral et. al. [1] analyzed the log growth rates of
publicly traded US manufacturing firms in the period 1974 – 93 and found
that growth rates, when aggregated across all sectors, appear to robustly follow
a Laplace (double exponential) form. This holds true whether growth rates are
measured by sales or number of employees. More precisely, if the annual growth
rate is r = ln( st+1
st
), where st is the size of a firm in year t, then for all years
the probability density of r is consistent with an exponential decay:
f(r) ∝ e−| r−αβ | (4)
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with some deviation from the Laplace distribution at high and low growth
rates resulting in slightly ‘fatter wings’ [24,3,2]. Bottazzi and Secchi [7] repli-
cate these findings and report a Laplace growth distribution for Italian man-
ufacturing firms during the period 1989–96.
Firm growth in the SR model is measured according to:
Firm growth rate measure: After each year (an application of rule 1Y) cal-
culate the current size, st, for a firm that traded at some point during the
year. Size is measured in terms of number of employees or total sales rev-
enue. The growth rate is st/st−1. (If a firm ceased trading during the year
then st = 1, and if a firm began trading during the year then st−1 = 1).
The SR model generates log annual growth rates for firms that are consistent
with a Laplace distribution, whether growth is measured in terms of sales
or number of employees. Figure 3 plots log growth rates in log-linear scale
and reveals the characteristic ‘tent’ shape signature of a symmetric exponen-
tial decay. There is some deviation from a Laplace distribution for firms with
shrinking sales, which may be due to noise or represent some non-accidental
property. Bottazii and Secchi note that standard economic models do not pre-
dict a Laplace growth distribution and propose a stochastic model to explain
the data that, in the abstract, shares similarities to firm growth in this model.
Briefly, both models assume firm growth is a multiplicative stochastic process
constrained by global resources (this kind of process is embedded in the gen-
eral dynamics of the SR model). The SR model is intended to model the social
relations of production, and therefore the replication of the empirical Laplace
growth distribution suggests that the social relations of production play an
important role in constraining the dynamics of firm growth.
Refs. [24,15,2,3,43] note that the standard deviation (std) of growth rates
decreases as a power law with size, that is, lnσ(r) ∼ −β ln r, where β ≈ 0.15.
The SR model does not replicate this finding given the specified wage interval.
In fact, ln σ(r) appears to increase as a power law with size, although the data
is quite noisy. However, the exponent of the power law is sensitive to the wage
parameter, and it is possible to replicate the empirical relationship at lower
average wages. Explanations of the relationship between growth variation and
size assume that firms have internal structures such that increased size lessens
market risk [2,3], which contrasts with the simple firm structure employed in
this model. Axtell in ref. [4] presents an agent-based model of the life-cycle
of firms that replicates the Zipf size distribution, Laplace growth rates and
power-law scaling of the std of growth. Firms in Axtell’s model have more
complex internal relations between employees who make optimising decisions
on the trade-off between effort and reward.
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3.4 Firm demise distribution
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Fig. 4. Firm demises distribution: Histogram of firm demises per simulated month in
log-linear scale with a constant bin size of 1. The solid line is a fit to the lognormal
distribution. Cook and Ormerod [10] report that the distribution of US firm demises
per year during the period 1989 to 1997 is closely approximated by a lognormal
distribution.
Cook and Ormerod [10] report that the distribution of US firm demises per
year during the period 1989 to 1997 is closely approximated by a lognormal
distribution, and note that the number of demises varies little from year to
year with no clear connection to recession or growth.
The number of firm demises per month in the simulation is measured according
to:
Firm demise measure: After each month (an application of rule 1M) count
the number of firm demises that occurred during the month. A firm demise
occurs when a firm fires all its employees.
Demises per month are measured rather than per year in order to avoid buck-
eting the data. Figure 4 is a histogram of firm demises per month with a
fitted lognormal distribution. It shows that the model generates a distribu-
tion of firm demises that is approximated by a lognormal distribution and is
therefore consistent with empirical findings.
According to Cook and Ormerod the average number of firms in the US during
the period 1989 to 1997 was 5.73 million, of which on average 611,000 died each
year. So roughly 10% of firms die each year. In the simulation on average 18
firms die each month and therefore on average 216 firms die each year, a figure
in excess of the 123 firms that exist on average. So although the distribution
of firm demises is consistent with empirical data, the rate at which firms are
born and die is much higher than in reality. This is not too surprising when it
is considered that the model entirely abstracts from the material nature of the
goods and services processed by the economy and any persistent demand for
them. In this model firms compete by playing a game of chance that models
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the unpredictability of a competitive economy. But the complete absence of
the material side of the economy results in an unrealistic level of volatility
in market interactions. The SR model must therefore be extended to include
causal relations between the social architecture and the forces of production.
Clearly there is a limit to what may be deduced from consideration of the
social relations of production alone.
3.5 GDP growth
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Fig. 5. Rescaled GDP growth rate distribution: histogram of the log growth rate
of GDP in linear-log scale with a constant bin size of 1. The solid lines are OLS
regressions of the data and represent a Laplace (double-exponential) distribution
P (x) ∝ e−|(x−α)/β|. Ref. [24] reports that log GDP growth rates of 152 countries
during the period 1950–92 follow a Laplace distribution.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) measures the value of gross production at
current prices, including consumption and gross investment. Lee at. al. [24]
and Canning et. al. [9] analyse the GDP of 152 countries during the period
1950–52 and find that the distribution of GDP log growth rates is consistent
with a Laplace distribution, and therefore conclude that firm growth and GDP
growth are subject to the same laws [24].
The GDP growth rate in the SR model is measured according to the following
rule:
GDP growth measure: At the close of year t calculate the total firm income,
Xt, received during that year (i.e., all income received during application of
rule M1). The GDP growth rate is then Xt/Xt−1.
Empirical measurements of GDP must be detrended to remove the effects of
inflation but this is unnecessary when measuring GDP in the model due to
the assumption of a fixed amount of money.
Figure 5 plots log GDP growth rate for the simulated economy in log-linear
scale. The data is noisy but consistent with a Laplace distribution when sam-
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pled over a period of 100 years so for clarity figure 5 contains data from an
extended run of 500 years. The characteristic tent shape indicates that the SR
model is consistent with the Laplace distribution of GDP growth.
Gatti et. al. in ref. [20] present an agent-based model of the life-cycle of firms
that replicates the Zipf size distribution and Laplace growth rates of firms
and aggregate output (GDP). They show that the power-law of firm size im-
plies that growth is Laplace distributed and also that small micro-shocks can
aggregate into macro-shocks to generate recessions. Firms in their model are
not disaggregated into employees and employers and market shocks are exoge-
nous, whereas in this model firms are composed of individuals and are subject
to endogenous shocks that are the consequence of the competition for a finite
amount of available market value, itself a product of income flows.
3.6 Duration of recessions
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Fig. 6. Recession duration distribution: Histogram of the frequency of the duration
of recessions in log-linear scale with a constant bin size of 1. The solid line is a fit
to an exponential distribution, f(d) ∝ λe−λd, with exponent λ = 1.22, representing
an average recession duration of 1.22 simulated years.
Wright [45], reinterpreting empirical data presented by Ormerod and Moun-
field [33], concludes that the frequency of the duration of economic recessions,
where a recession is defined as a period of shrinking GDP, follows an exponen-
tial law for 17 Western economies over the period 1871–1994. Recessions tend
not to last longer than 6 years, the majority of recessions last 1 year, and for
the US the longest recession has been only 4 years [34].
The duration of recessions in the simulation is measured according to the
following rule:
Recession duration measure: A recession begins when
Xt/Xt−1 < 1
and ends when
Xt+k/Xt+k−1 ≥ 1
17
The duration of the recession is k years.
The SR model is in close agreement with these empirical findings. Figure 6 is a
histogram of the frequency of the duration of recessions collected over a period
of 500 simulated years. The functional form of the frequency of duration of
recessions is exponential, f(d) ∝ λ e−λd, with λ = 1.22, which compares to a
value of λ = 0.94 for the empirical data [45]. The value of λ is the average
duration of a recession. Also, the duration of recessions in the model ranges
from 1 to 4 simulated years.
3.7 Income shares
GDP is the sum of revenues received by firms during a single year. Firms pay
the total wage bill, W , from this revenue. Hence the total value of domestic
output is divided into a share that workers receive as wages, Xw =
W
X
, and the
remainder that capitalists receive as profit, Xp = 1−Xw. Advanced capitalist
countries publish national income accounts that allow wage and profit shares
to be calculated, which reveal some characteristic features. Shares in national
income have remained fairly stable during the twentieth century, despite un-
dergoing yearly fluctuations. For example, the profit share, normally lower
than the wage share, is between 0.25 to 0.4 of GDP, although it occasionally
can be as high as 0.5 (source: Foley and Michl’s calculations in ref. [17] for
US, UK and Japan spanning a period of over 100 years; other authors place
the wage share nearer to 1
2
, for example on average 0.54 between 1929 and
1941 for the USA [21] and similar in chapters 3 and 8 of ref. [16]).
Income shares in the simulation are measured according to:
Income shares measure: Calculate the GDP, X , for the year. Count the
total income received by workers during the same year (i.e., income received
during application of rule W1), which is defined as the total wage bill W .
The wage share is Xw =
W
X
, and the profit share is Xp = 1−Xw.
Figure 7 is a plot of the shares in national income generated by the model. The
profit share is generally lower than the wage share, and the yearly fluctuations
are normally distributed about long-term stable values. Ignoring differences of
definition, and for the purposes of a rough and ready comparison, the model
generates an average profit share of 0.45, which compares well to the empirical
data. The model therefore reproduces the empirical situation of fluctuations
about a long-term stable mean, and additionally the profit and wage shares
have realistic values, although it is an open question whether suitably de-
trended fluctuations are normally distributed in capitalist economies.
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Fig. 7. Wage and profit shares in national income. The LHS graph is a representative
time series of the fluctuating shares in national income. GDP, denoted X, is the
sum of revenues received by firms during a single year. The solid triangles are the
wage share, Xw, which represents the sum total of wages paid to the working class,
W , divided by GDP, Xw =
W
X . The solid squares are the profit share, Xp, which
represents the sum total of profits received by the capitalist class divided by GDP,
Xp = 1 − WX . The wage share fluctuates around a mean of 0.55 and the profit
share fluctuates around a mean of 0.45. The RHS graph is a histogram of the ratio
W
1−W . The smooth line is a fitted pdf of the ratio of two normal variates, which
indicates that fluctuations of shares in national income are normally distributed
around long-term stable means.
3.8 Disaggregated income distributions
Income shares can be disaggregated and measured at the level of individuals
in order to understand income differentiation within classes. The empirical
income distribution is characterised by a highly unequal distribution of in-
come, in which a very small number of households receive a disproportionate
amount of the total (e.g., using wealth as an indicator of income, in 1996 the
top 1% of individuals in the US owned 40% of the total wealth [26]). The
higher, property-income, regime of the income distribution can be fitted to
a Pareto (or power) distribution [25,26,28,14,30,31,41], whereas the lower, or
wage-income, regime, which represents the vast majority of the population,
is normally fitted to a lognormal distribution [41,29,6], but recently some
researchers [31,14,13] report that an exponential (Boltzmann-Gibbs) distri-
bution better describes the empirical data. Plotting the income distribution
as a complementary cumulative distribution function (ccdf) in log-log scale
reveals a characteristic ‘knee’ shape at the transition between the two regimes
[28,14,13,41,31].
The functional form of the income distribution is stable over many years,
although the parameters seem to fluctuate within narrow bounds. For example,
for property-income, the power-law, P (x) ∝ x−(α+1), has a value α = 1.3 for
the UK in 1970 [25], α = [1.1, 1.3] for Australia between 1993 and 1997 [28],
α = 1.7 for US in 1998 [14], on average α = 1.0 for post-war Japan [30],
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(a) The complete income distribution
plotted as a ccdf in log-log scale. The
data is binned at a constant size of
1. Note the characteristic ‘knee’ shape,
a feature found in empirical distribu-
tions. The transition from the lognor-
mal to the Pareto regime occurs be-
tween P (x) = 0.1 and P (x) = 0.01,
which means that under 10% of in-
comes follow the Pareto law.
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(b) The class components of the income
distribution plotted as ccdfs in log-log
scale. Note the long tail of the capitalist
income distribution. Worker income is
clustered around the average wage.
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(c) The lower regime of the income
distribution plotted in log-linear scale.
The solid line is a fit to a lognormal dis-
tribution. The approximately lognor-
mal distribution results from a mixture
of wage income and small employer in-
come.
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(d) The power law regime of the income
distribution plotted as a ccdf in log-log
scale. The straight line is a fit to the
power (Pareto) law, P (x) ∝ x−(α+1),
where α = 1.3.
Fig. 8. Graphical analysis of the stationary income distribution. Incomes are mea-
sured over the duration of a year and the data is collected over the duration of the
simulation.
and α = [0.5, 1.5] for US and Japan between 1960 and 1999 [31]. In sum,
the income distribution is asymptotically a power-law with shape parameter
α ≈ 1.0, and this regime normally characterises the top 1% to 5% of incomes.
20
The two-parameter lognormal distribution
P (x) =
1
xσ
√
2pi
exp(
−(log x
m
)2
2σ2
) (5)
where m is the median, and β = 1/
√
2σ2 is the Gibrat index, can describe the
remaining 95% or so of incomes. For example, for post-war Japan, the Gibrat
index ranges between approximately β = 2.25 and β = 3.0 [41]. In contrast,
if the lower income range is fitted to an exponential law
P (x) ∝ λ eλx (6)
then by analogy with a perfect gas, from which the Boltzmann-Gibbs law
originates, λ is interpreted as an average economic ‘temperature’, which should
be close to the average wealth in the economy, adjusting for the effects of the
Pareto tail.
The SR model is in close qualitative and quantitative agreement with all these
empirical facts. It also explains why there are two major income regimes, and
provides a candidate explanation of why the distribution of low incomes is
sometimes identified as either lognormal or exponential.
Incomes in the simulation are measured according to the following rule:
Incomes measure: After each year (an application of rule 1Y) calculate the
total income received by each actor during the year. Both wage income (from
rule W1) and capitalist income (from rule M1) are counted as income.
Figure 8(a) is a plot of the stationary income ccdf generated by the model. It
reproduces the characteristic ‘knee’ shape found in empirical income distribu-
tions. The ‘knee’ is formed by the transition from the lower regime, consisting
mainly of the wealth of the working class and owners of small firms, to the
higher regime, consisting mainly of the wealth of the capitalist class. The knee
occurs at around P (M ≥ m) = 0.1, which means the power-law regime holds
for at most 10% of incomes.
Figure 8(b) splits the income distribution according to class. The capitalist
distribution has a long tail, qualitatively different from the worker distribu-
tion, which is clustered around the average wage. Figure 8(c) is a plot of the
lower regime of the income distribution in log-linear scale fitted to a lognor-
mal distribution with Gibrat index β = 1.42. Figure 8(d) is a plot of the
property-income regime in log-log scale. The straight line fit indicates that
higher incomes asymptotically approach a power-law distribution of the form
P (x) ∝ x−(α+1), with α = 1.3. The two income regimes are consequences of the
two major sources of income in capitalist societies, that is wages and profits,
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and the overall income distribution is a mixture of two qualitatively different
distributions. The lower regime is fitted better by a lognormal distribution
rather than an exponential. The lognormal distribution, in this model, is not
the result of stochastic multiplicative process, which is the explanation often
proposed, but results from a mixture of normally distributed wage incomes
and the profit-income of small firm owners. It is an open question whether
the lognormal distribution found in empirical data can be similarly explained
by the combined effect of income from employment and the income of small
employers.
At first glance it appears that the model contradicts empirical evidence that
the lower income regime is exponentially distributed. But if the stationary
distribution of money holdings (i.e., instantaneous wealth) is measured, rather
than income, a different picture emerges, which may help explain the lack of
consensus in empirical studies. Wealth is measured according to the following
rule:
Wealth measure: After each year (an application of rule 1Y) calculate the
total money held by each actor.
Figure 9 is a plot of the stationary money ccdf generated by the model. As
before, figure 9(a) reproduces the characteristic ‘knee’ shape found in empirical
income distributions. But in this case the lower regime is characterised by
an exponential (or Boltzmann-Gibbs) distribution. The transition between
regimes occurs approximately in the middle of the ccdf corresponding to a
situation in which the total wealth in the economy is distributed approximately
evenly between the classes. Figure 9(c) plots the workers’ money distribution
in log-linear scale. The straight line fit reveals an exponential distribution of
the form P (x) = λ eλx, where λ = 0.017, which is indeed close to the average
wealth in the economy, λ = M
N
= 0.01 [12]. Figure 9(d) plots the capitalists’
money distribution in log-log scale. The straight line fit reveals a power-law
distribution with similar exponent to that of income.
The higher income and wealth regimes are qualitatively identical, but the lower
income and wealth regimes are qualitatively distinct. Measuring the lower end
of income yields a lognormal distribution, whereas measuring the lower end
of wealth yields an exponential. Income depends solely on monies received
during an accounting period, whereas wealth depends on both income and
spending patterns. The differences between the empirical studies could be due
to differences in whether the measures employed are predominately income
measures or wealth measures.
The lognormal and power-law fits are only approximations to the true distri-
butions, and a full analysis of the income distribution is postponed. However,
a few brief points can be made. A popular explanation of the power-law tail
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(a) The complete money distribution
plotted as a ccdf in log-log scale. The
transition from the Boltzmann-Gibbs
to Pareto regime occurs in the middle
of the ccdf. The data is binned at a con-
stant size of 1.
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(b) The class components of the money
distribution plotted as ccdfs in log-log
scale. Note the long tail of the capitalist
money distribution.
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(c) A section of the workers’ money
ccdf plotted in linear-log scale. The
straight line is a fit to the exponential
(Boltzmann-Gibbs) law, P (x) = λeλx,
where λ = 0.017.
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Fig. 9. Graphical analysis of the stationary money distribution. Money holdings are
measured at the end of a year and the data is collected over the duration of the
simulation.
of the income distribution is that it arises from an underlying stochastic mul-
tiplicative process, often thought to model the geometric growth of capital
invested in financial markets [31,30,36,37,25,26,8]. The importance of financial
markets in determining capital flows and hence capitalist income is undeni-
able. But the model developed here shows that an income power-law can arise
from industrial capital invested in firms, absent financial markets that sup-
port capital reallocation between industries or between capitalists. Capitalist
income, in this model, is not derived from investment in portfolios that pro-
vide a return, but is composed of the sum of values added via the employment
of productive workers. In this sense, capitalist income is additive, not multi-
plicative. But workers are grouped in firms that follow a power-law of size.
Hence, the power-law of capitalist income is due to a power-law in the net-
23
work structure of the wage-capital relation. Di Matteo et. al. [28] show that an
additive stochastic model of interacting agents on a power-law network gener-
ates power-law distributions, and presumably a similar explanation accounts
for the capitalist income distribution generated by this model. Clearly, the
firm ownership structure in this model is highly simplified, and it is an open
question whether this conclusion holds in models that include joint ownership
of firms.
3.9 Rate-of-profit distribution
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Fig. 10. Capital-weighted rate-of-profit distribution: Histogram of amount of capi-
tal invested that generated a given percentage profit rate within a simulated year.
The data is collected over the duration of the simulation and binned at a constant
size of 1. The average profit rate is 80.5% and the median profit rate is 64% (on
average 1 coin invested returns 1.8 coins). Wells [44] measured the profit rate dis-
tribution of over 100,000 UK firms trading in 1981 and found that the distribution
was right-skewed.
Farjoun and Machover [16] propose that the proportion of industrial capital
(out of the total capital invested in the economy) that finds itself in any
given rate-of-profit bracket will be approximated by a gamma distribution by
analogy with the distribution of kinetic energy in a gas at equilibrium. The
gamma distribution is a right-skewed distribution. Wells [44] measured the
rate-of-profit distribution of over 100,000 UK firms trading in 1981 and found
that in general the distribution was right-skewed, whatever precise definition
of profit was used, although the data was not well characterised by a gamma
distribution.
In reality capitalist owners of firms invest in both variable (wages) and con-
stant capital (investment in commodity inputs to the production process and
relatively long-lasting means of production) [32] and the rate-of-profit is cal-
culated on the total capital invested. The SR model abstracts from the forces
of production and hence capitalist owners invest only in variable capital (i.e.
expenditures on wages due to the application of rule W1). Capitalists also
spend income in the marketplace according to rule E1, and this expenditure
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Fig. 11. Firm-weighted rate-of-profit distribution: Histogram of number of firms
that generated a given percentage profit rate within a simulated year. The data is
collected over the duration of the simulation and binned at a constant size of 1.
Wells [44] measured the firm-weighted profit rate distribution of over 100,000 UK
firms trading in 1981 and found that, similar to the capital-weighted rate-of-profit,
the distribution was right-skewed, although less noisy.
could be interpreted as either consumption or investment in constant capital,
but to theoretically ground the latter interpretation the model would need to
be extended to include a determination of the distribution of ratios of con-
stant to variable capital across firms. Rather than introduce the material side
of the economy, which properly belongs to future substantive extensions of
the model, the rate-of-profit in the simulation is calculated on variable capital
alone. Hence rate-of-profit measures will exceed those found empirically.
The rate-of-profit distribution in the model is measured according to:
Profit rate measure: After each year (an application of rule 1Y) calculate
the profit rate for each firm trading at the close of the year. The profit rate,
pi, of firm i is defined as
pi = 100
(
ri
wi
− 1
)
(7)
where ri is the total revenue received during the year and wi is the total
wages paid during the year.
Figure 10 graphs the amount of capital that returned a given profit within
a year. Consistent with empirical research the distribution is highly right-
skewed. Wells [44] reports that if the rate-of-profit is weighted according to
number of firms, rather than capital invested, the distribution is also right-
skewed and very similar in overall character, although less noisy. Figure 11
graphs the firm-weighted distribution from the simulation. It is also right-
skewed, like the capital-weighted distribution, but considerably less noisy. The
SR model provides the opportunity to deduce an analytical form for the in-
dustrial rate-of-profit distribution given additional assumptions on capital in-
vestment. As a step toward this goal an approximation to the firm-weighted
25
rate-of-profit distribution in the SR model is now derived.
Consider a single firm that trades for a single year and has an average size of
s employees during this period. The firm samples the market on average 12s
times during a year. This is a simplification, as during a year, firms are created
and destroyed, and therefore do not necessarily interact with the marketplace
over the whole year. The value of each market sample, Mi, is a function of
the instantaneous money distribution, which is mixture of exponential and
Pareto forms. Assume eachMi is independent and identically distributed (iid)
with mean µm and variance σ
2
m. During a month the same employee may be
repeatedly selected, or not selected, due to the causal slack introduced by
rule 1M. Therefore the value generated per employee per month, Vi, is some
function f of Mi independent of the firm size s. Simplifying further to avoid
detailed consideration of the distribution of market samples per employee,
assume that f(x) = x + v, where v is a constant. Hence each Vi is idd with
mean µ1 = µm + v and variance σ
2
1 = σ
2
m. By the Central Limit Theorem the
sum of the firm’s market samples in a year, which constitutes the total revenue,
R, can be approximated by a normal distribution R =
∑
Vi ≈ N(µr, σ2r ), where
µr = 12sµ1 and σ
2
r = 12sσ
2
1.
The firm’s total wage bill for the year, W , is the sum of 12(s− 1) individual
wage payments, ωi. Note that the capitalist owner does not receive wages.
Each ωi is iid according to a uniform distribution, ωi ∼ U(ωa, ωb), with mean
µ2 = (ωa + ωb)/2 and variance σ
2
2 = (ωb − ωa)2/12. By the Central Limit
Theorem the wage bill, W , can be approximated by a normal distribution
W =
∑
ωi ≈ N(µw, σ2w), where µw = 12(s− 1)µ2 and σ2w = 12(s− 1)σ22.
Define the ratio of revenue to the wage bill as X = R/W and assume that R
and W are independent. X is the ratio of two normal variates and its pdf is
derived by the transformation method to give:
fX(x | s)=
exp
[
−1
2
(µ
2
r
σ2r
+ µ
2
w
σ2w
)
]
4pik
3/2
1(
2σrσw
√
k1 + e
Λ(x)
√
2pi(1 + Φ(
√
Λ(x)))(µwσ
2
r + xµrσ
2
w)
)
(8)
where
k1=σ
2
r + x
2σ2w
Λ(x) =
(µwσ
2
r + xµrσ
2
w)
2
2σ2rσ
2
w(σ
2
r + x
2σ2w)
Φ(x) =
2√
pi
x∫
0
e−t
2
t.
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(8) is the pdf of the rate-of-profit conditional on the firm size s. The uncon-
ditional rate-of-profit distribution can be obtained by considering that firm
sizes are distributed according to a Pareto (power-law) distribution:
fS(s) =
αβα
sα+1
where α is the shape and β the location parameter. Firm sizes in the model
range between 1 (a degenerate case of an unemployed worker) to a maximum
possible size N . Therefore the truncated Pareto distribution
gS(s) = fS(s | 1 < S ≤ N) = f(s)
F (N)− F (1) =
s−(1+α)α
1−N−α
where
f(s) = F ′(s)
is formed to ensure that all the probability mass is between 1 and N . By the
Theorem of Total Probability the unconditional distribution fX(x) is given
by:
fX(x) =
N∫
2
fX(x | s)gS(s)s. (9)
where the range of integration is between 2 and N as firms of size 1 are a
degenerate case that do not report profits. Expression (9) defines the gS(s)
parameter-mix of fX(x | S = s). The rate-of-profit variate is therefore com-
posed of a parameter-mix of a ratio of independent normal variates each con-
ditional on a firm size s that is distributed according to a power-law. Writing
(9) in full yields:
fX(x) =
N∫
2
exp
[
−6( sµ21
σ2
1
+
(s−1)µ2
2
σ2
2
)
]
2piΘ3/2(x)
k2√Θ(x) +√6piΨ(x) exp
[
6Ψ2(x)
k22Θ(x)
]
1 + Φ(
√
6Ψ(x)
k2
√
Θ(x)
)




s−(1+α)α
1−N−α s. (10)
where
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k2=
√
sσ21
√
(s− 1)σ22
Θ(x) = sσ21 + (s− 1)x2σ22
Ψ(x) = (s− 1)s(µ2σ21 + xµ1σ22)
(10) is the pdf ofX = R/W but the rate-of-profit in the simulation is measured
as P = 100 (X − 1). The pdf of P is therefore a linear transform of X:
fP (x) =
1
100
fX(1 +
x
100
) (11)
(11) defines a distribution with 6 parameters: (i) the mean employee market
sample µ1, (ii) the variance of the employee market sample σ
2
1, (iii) the mean
wage µ2, (iv) the wage variance σ2, (v) the Pareto exponent, α, of the firm
size distribution, and (vi) the number of economic actors N .
(11) is solved numerically to compare the distribution of the theoretically
derived variate P with the profit data generated by the SR model. The values
of the parameters are measured from the simulation. In this particular case
µ1 = µm + v ≈ 50 + v, σ21 = σ2m ≈ 55000, µ2 ≈ 50, σ22 ≈ 533.3, α ≈ 1.04
and N = 1000. The best fit is achieved with v = 25 coins. Figure 12 plots the
pdf fP (x) with the rate-of-profit frequency histogram of Fig. 11 and shows a
reasonable fit between the derived distribution and the data.
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Fig. 12. Theoretical fit to the firm-weighted rate-of-profit distribution. The solid
lines plot the theoretical pdf fP (x) scaled by a constant in the frequency axis. The
RHS graph plots the function and data in log-log scale and extends the range of the
plot to the super-profit range. All profits in excess of 10000 are truncated, which
accounts for the outlier at the maximum profit rate.
With some further work the 6-parameter distribution fP (x) could be fitted
to empirical rate-of-profit measures and compared against other candidate
functional forms. Although (11) ignores effects due to capital investment the
interpretation of the parameters µ1, σ
2
1 , µ2 and σ
2
2 can be extended to refer
to the means and variances of revenue and cost per employee. A testable
consequence of the SR model is the conjecture that the empirical rate-of-
profit distribution will be consistent with a parameter-mix of a ratio of normal
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variates with means and variances that depend on a firm size parameter that
is distributed according to a power law.
4 Discussion
The empirical coverage of the SR model is broad although the model can be
formally stated in a small number of simple economic rules that control the
dynamics. The model compresses and connects a large number of empirical
facts within a single causal framework. But this paper only introduces the
model and is merely a starting point for further analysis and investigation.
The enormous benefit of exploring computational models of phenomena is that
the complex dynamic consequences of a set of causal rules can be automati-
cally and correctly deduced by running a computer program that performs a
computational deduction. In this case the deduction is from micro-economic
social relations to emergent, macro-economic phenomena. But the reasons why
a set of causal rules necessarily generate the observed dynamic consequences
may initially be opaque precisely because a computer simulation is required
to perform the deduction. This is why computational modelling is not an al-
ternative to mathematical modelling but is intimately connected to it. To give
just one example, within the parameter space explored, the SR model gen-
erates fluctuations in national income about long-term stable means. But it
requires a mathematical deduction to understand why this necessarily occurs.
The computational model unequivocally demonstrates that in principle such
a deduction exists and its basic elements and assumptions will correspond to
those of the computational model. Of course, a deductive proof may be more
or less difficult to construct even if it is known to exist. So one use of com-
putational modelling is to more easily identify candidate theories, which may
then be further analysed to generate explanations in the form of mathemati-
cal deductions or natural language explanations, the aim being to understand
why the dynamic consequences are logically necessary. An example of the po-
tential of this approach is the deduction of a candidate functional form for the
distribution of industrial profit. Contrast this situation to a purely mathemat-
ical approach, in which the investigator may only explore candidate theories
that are directly amenable to mathematical deduction. This methodology is
unnecessarily restrictive, particularly if the system presents difficult analytic
challenges.
The model has something to say about a broad range of macro-economic phe-
nomena that have already been intensively studied and theorised in standard
economic theories, for example business cycle phenomena. The relationship
between the model presented here and existing economic models of particular
economic phenomena is a topic for further research. It is likely, for instance,
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that some of the stochastic models elaborated in the econophysics literature
may be embedded within the overall dynamics of the SR model, particularly
those that are more narrowly focussed on explaining certain distributions in
isolation, such as firm size, income and company growth. However, a new re-
quirement for more narrowly focussed models is they provide more detailed
and exact explanations for particular phenomena than those provided by the
broad but shallow SR model.
The fact that the empirical distributions considered can be deduced from the
social relations of production alone suggests that some of the striking phe-
nomena of a capitalist economy depend not so much on specifics but on very
general and highly abstract structural features of that system. In consequence,
existing theories may be looking in the wrong place for economic explanations,
or at least introducing redundant considerations. Given this possibility, it is
worth making a few comments to contrast the approach taken in this pa-
per to standard approaches, if only to emphasise that this new approach is
theoretically motivated.
The ontology of this model differs from standard economic models. Standard
competitive equilibrium models, or neoclassical models, normally take as their
starting point an ontology of rational actors that maximise self-interest in a
market for scarce resources [11]. Attention is focussed on determining the
equilibrium exchange ratios of commodity types, which are solutions to a
set of simultaneous, static constraints. Historical time is absent, so equilib-
rium states are logically rather than causally derived, and typically money is
not modelled. Neo-Ricardian models, in contrast, take as their starting point
an ontology of technical production relations between commodity types that
define the available material transformations that economic actors may per-
form. The production of commodities by means of commodities [42] results
in a surplus product that is distributed to capitalists and workers [35]. De-
spite many essential differences, there are some important similarities between
neo-classical and neo-Ricardian models. For example, prices in neo-Ricardian
models are also exchange ratios determined by solutions to static, simulta-
neous constraints. Similarly, historical time is absent, so there is no causal
explanation of how or why a particular configuration of the economy arose.
Money only plays a nominal not a causal role. There are clear differences
between, on the one hand, neo-classical and neo-Ricardian ontologies, and,
on the other, the basic ontology of the model developed here. Most obvious
is that commodity types and rational actors are absent. Instead, the model
emphasises precisely those elements of economic reality that neo-classical and
neo-Ricardian theories tend to ignore, specifically actor-to-actor relations me-
diated by money, which unfold in historical time, and result in dynamic, not
static, equilibria. At a high level of abstraction, and at the risk of over simplifi-
cation, neo-classical models theorise scarcity constraints, neo-Ricardian mod-
els theorise technical-production constraints, whereas this model theorises the
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dynamic consequences of social constraints, which are historically contingent
facts about the way in which economic production is socially organised.
As argued elsewhere [16,23] exclusive emphasis on the ontology of standard
economic models is inimical to further progress in the field of political econ-
omy. The SR model constitutes constructive proof that the standard ontology
is redundant for forming explanations of the empirical phenomena surveyed
in this paper. This is not to assert that some other, perhaps more concrete
issues, may require consideration of purposive activity for their explanation
and hence the introduction of rational actors, or require consideration of tech-
nical production constraints and hence the introduction of commodity types.
Rather, the claim is that, for the empirical aggregates considered, there is no
need to perform the standard reduction of political economy to psychology and
the technical conditions of production, and further, that the dominant causal
factors at work are not to be found at the level of individual behaviour, nor are
they to be found at the level of technical-production constraints, but are found
at the level of the social relations of production, which constitute an abstract,
but nevertheless real, social architecture that constrains the possible actions
that purposive individuals may choose between, whether optimally or other-
wise. This is why the actors in this model probabilistically choose between
possible economic actions constrained only by their class status and current
money endowments, an approach that is closer to the classical conception of
political economy, in which individuals are considered to be representatives of
economic classes that have definite relations to each other in the process of pro-
duction. The social architecture, in particular the wage-capital social relation,
dominates individuals, who, although free to make local economic decisions,
do so in a social environment neither of their own choosing or control.
It may be objected that economic actors are clearly purposive and it is there-
fore essential to model individual rationality, even when considering macro-
level phenomena. The underlying assumption of the rational actor approach
to economics is that macro phenomena are reducible to and determined by
the mechanisms of individual rationality. Farjoun and Machover [16] noted
some time ago that the successful physical theory of statistical mechanics is
in direct contradiction to this assumption. For example, classical statistical
mechanics models the molecules of a gas as idealised, perfectly elastic billiard
balls. This is of course a gross oversimplification of a molecule’s structure and
how it interacts with other molecules. Yet statistical mechanics can deduce
empirically valid macro-phenomena. Quoting Khinchin [22]:
Those general laws of mechanics which are used in statistical mechanics are
necessary for any motions of material particles, no matter what are the forces
causing such motions. It is a complete abstraction from the nature of these
forces, that gives to statistical mechanics its specific features and contributes
to its deductions all the necessary flexibility. ... the specific character of the
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systems studied in statistical mechanics consists mainly in the enormous
number of degrees of freedom which these systems possess. Methodologically
this means that the standpoint of statistical mechanics is determined not
by the mechanical nature, but by the particle structure of matter. It almost
seems as if the purpose of statistical mechanics is to observe how far reaching
are the deductions made on the basis of the atomic structure of matter,
irrespective of the nature of these atoms and the laws of their interaction.
(Eng. trans. Dover, 1949, pp. 8–9).
The method of abstracting from the mechanics of individual rationality, and
instead emphasising the particle nature of individuals, is valid because the
number of degrees of freedom of economic reality is very large. This allows
individual rationality to be modelled as a highly simplified stochastic selection
from possibilities determined by an overriding social architecture. The quasi-
psychological motives that supposedly drive individual actors in the rational
actor approach can be ignored because in a large ensemble of such individuals
they hardly matter.
5 Conclusion
The aim was to understand the possible economic consequences of the social re-
lations of production considered in isolation and develop a model that included
money and historical time as essential elements. The theoretical motivation
for the approach is grounded in Marx’s distinction between the invariant so-
cial relations of production and the varying forces of production. Standard
economic models typically do not pursue this distinction. The model of the
social relations of production replicates some important empirical features of
modern capitalism, such as (i) the tendency toward capital concentration re-
sulting in a highly unequal income distribution characterised by a lognormal
distribution with a Pareto tail, (ii) the Zipf or power-law distribution of firm
sizes, (iii) the Laplace distribution of firm size and GDP growth, (iv) the ex-
ponential distribution of recession durations, (v) the lognormal distribution
of firm demises, and (vi) the gamma-like rate-of-profit distribution. Also, the
model naturally generates groups of capitalists, workers and unemployed in re-
alistic proportions, and business cycle phenomena, including fluctuating wage
and profit shares in national income. The good qualitative and in many cases
quantitative fit between model and empirical phenomena suggests that the
theory presented here captures some essential features of capitalist economies,
demonstrates the causal importance of the social relations of production, and
provides a basis for more concrete and elaborated models. A testable con-
jecture is that measures of the empirical rate-of-profit distribution will be
consistent with a parameter-mix of a ratio of normal variates with means
and variances that depend on a firm size parameter that is distributed as a
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power-law.
A final and important implication is that the computational deduction out-
lined in this paper implies that some of the features of economic reality that
cause political conflict, such as extreme income inequality and recessions, are
necessary consequences of the social relations of production and hence endur-
ing and essential properties of capitalism, rather than accidental, exogenous
or transitory.
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